FATF Best Practices Documents

Detecting and Preventing the Cross-Border Transportation of Cash by Terrorists and Other Criminals - International Best Practices

The use of cash couriers is now recognised as a major method for terrorists to move funds. To address this issue, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) issued Special Recommendation IX and its Interpretative Note which were developed with the objective of preventing terrorists and other criminals from using cash couriers to finance their activities or launder their funds. While the Interpretative Note is intended to further explain the obligations set out in Special Recommendation IX, this Best Practices Paper is intended to give additional details and guidance for jurisdictions on how to detect cash couriers and how to implement effective measures to prevent the use of cash couriers by terrorists and other criminals.

Financial Action Task Force
February 2005

Freezing of Terrorist Assets - International Best Practices

Responding to the growing prevalence of terrorist attacks around the world, the international community united in a campaign to freeze the funds or other assets2 of terrorists, those who finance terrorism, and terrorist organisations around the world. As part of this campaign, the United Nations Security Council issued resolutions S/RES/1267(1999) and S/RES/1373(2001). These international obligations are reiterated in FATF Special Recommendation III (SR III). The Interpretative Note to SR III (Interpretative Note) explains how these international freezing obligations should be fulfilled. To further assist in this effort, the FATF has identified the following set of best practices which are based on jurisdictions’ experience to date and which may serve as a benchmark for developing institutional, legal, and procedural frameworks of an effective terrorist financing freezing regime.3 These best practices are organised along five basic themes and complement the obligations set forth in the Interpretative Note. A common element to each of these themes is the importance of sharing terrorist financing information.

Financial Action Task Force
October 2003

Combating the Abuse of Alternative Remittance Systems - International Best Practices

While the Interpretative Note is intended to further explain Special Recommendation VI, the Best Practices Paper is intended to give additional details (including some examples), to offer jurisdictions suggestions in implementing Special Recommendation VI and to give them guidance on how to detect alternative remittance systems outside the conventional financial sector. It focuses on many practical issues, such as the identification of money/value transfer services, the procedures for licensing or registering such services and their customer due diligence procedures.

Financial Action Task Force
June 2003

Combating the Abuse of Non-Profit Organizations - International Best Practices

The misuse of non-profit organisations for the financing of terrorism is coming to be recognised as a crucial weak point in the global struggle to stop such funding at its source. This issue has captured the attention of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the G7, and the United Nations, as well as national authorities in many regions. Within the FATF, this has rightly become the priority focus of work to implement Special Recommendation VIII (Non-profit organisations).

Financial Action Task Force
October 2002

Providing Feedback to Reporting Financial Institutions and Other Persons

Based on the types and methods of feedback currently provided in a range of FATF member countries, this set of best practice guidelines will consider why providing feedback is necessary and important. The guidelines illustrate what is best practice in providing general feedback on money laundering and the results of suspicious transaction reports by setting out the different types of feedback and other information which could be provided and the methods for providing such feedback. The guidelines also address the issue of specific or case by case feedback and the conflicting considerations which affect the level of specific feedback which is provided in each country. The suggestions contained herein are not mandatory requirements, but are meant to provide assistance and guidance to financial intelligence units, law enforcement and other government bodies which are involved in the receipt, analysis and investigation of suspicious transaction reports, and in the provision of feedback on those reports.

Financial Action Task Force
June 1998