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FATF Recommendations
The Forty Recommendations
Money laundering methods and techniques change in response to developing counter-measures. In
recent years, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has noted increasingly sophisticated
combinations of techniques, such as the increased use of legal persons to disguise the true ownership
and control of illegal proceeds, and an increased use of professionals to provide advice and assistance
in laundering criminal funds. These factors, combined with the experience gained through the FATF’s
Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories process, and a number of national and international
initiatives, led the FATF to review and revise the Forty Recommendations into a new comprehensive
framework for combating money laundering and terrorist financing. The FATF now calls upon all
countries to take the necessary steps to bring their national systems for combating money laundering
and terrorist financing into compliance with the new FATF Recommendations, and to effectively
implement these measures.
Financial Action Task Force
Amended October 2004

Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing
Recognising the vital importance of taking action to combat the financing of terrorism, the
FATF has agreed these Recommendations, which, when combined with the FATF Forty
Recommendations on money laundering, set out the basic framework to detect, prevent and
suppress the financing of terrorism and terrorist acts.
Financial Action Task Force
October 2001

Guidance Notes for the Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing
and the Self-Assessment Questionnaire
Since the adoption of the Special Recommendations, the FATF has had little time to develop
interpretations based on the experience of implementing these measures. Upon completion of the
initial phase of this exercise by FATF members, it was therefore decided that additional guidance
would be drafted and published to assist non-FATF members in understanding some of the concepts
contained in the Special Recommendations on terrorist financing and to clarify certain parts of the
SAQTF. This document therefore contains additional clarification of the Eight Special
Recommendations and the SAQTF.
Financial Action Task Force
March 2002

Review of the FATF 40 Recommendations - Consultation Paper
The FATF has identified a number of areas where possible changes could be made to
the FATF framework, and these are set out in detail in Sections 3-5 below. The broad topics
covered concern customer due diligence and suspicious transaction reporting, beneficial
ownership and control of corporate vehicles, and the application of anti-money laundering
obligations to non-financial businesses and professions. Each topic sets out the nature of the
problem or issue, identifies the risks, outlines the current position, and provides one or more
options or alternatives for dealing with the issue or risks.
Financial Action Task Force
May 2002

Interpretative Note to Special Recommendation III: Freezing and Confiscating Terrorist Assets
FATF Special Recommendation III consists of two obligations. The first requires jurisdictions
to implement measures that will freeze or, if appropriate, seize terrorist-related funds or other assets
without delay in accordance with relevant United Nations resolutions. The second obligation of
Special Recommendation III is to have measures in place that permit a jurisdiction to seize or
confiscate terrorist funds or other assets on the basis of an order or mechanism issued by a competent
authority or a court.
Financial Action Task Force

Interpretative Note to Special Recommendation VI: Alternative Remittance
Money or value transfer systems have shown themselves vulnerable to misuse for money
laundering and terrorist financing purposes. The objective of Special Recommendation VI is to
increase the transparency of payment flows by ensuring that jurisdictions impose consistent antimoney
laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures on all forms of money/value transfer
systems, particularly those traditionally operating outside the conventional financial sector and not
currently subject to the FATF Recommendations. This Recommendation and Interpretative Note
underscore the need to bring all money or value transfer services, whether formal or informal, within
the ambit of certain minimum legal and regulatory requirements in accordance with the relevant
FATF Recommendations.
Financial Action Task Force

Interpretative Note to Special Recommendation VII: Wire Transfers
Special Recommendation VII (SR VII) was developed with the objective of preventing
terrorists and other criminals from having unfettered access to wire transfers for moving their
funds and for detecting such misuse when it occurs. Specifically, it aims to ensure that basic
information on the originator of wire transfers is immediately available (1) to appropriate law
enforcement and/or prosecutorial authorities to assist them in detecting, investigating,
prosecuting terrorists or other criminals and tracing the assets of terrorists or other criminals,
(2) to financial intelligence units for analysing suspicious or unusual activity and
disseminating it as necessary, and (3) to beneficiary financial institutions to facilitate the
identification and reporting of suspicious transactions. It is not the intention of the FATF to
impose rigid standards or to mandate a single operating process that would negatively affect
the payment system.
Financial Action Task Force

Revised Interpretative Note to Special Recommendation VII: Wire Transfers
Special Recommendation VII (SR VII) was developed with the objective of preventing
terrorists and other criminals from having unfettered access to wire transfers for moving their
funds and for detecting such misuse when it occurs. Specifically, it aims to ensure that basic
information on the originator of wire transfers is immediately available (1) to appropriate law
enforcement and/or prosecutorial authorities to assist them in detecting, investigating,
prosecuting terrorists or other criminals and tracing the assets of terrorists or other criminals,
(2) to financial intelligence units for analysing suspicious or unusual activity and
disseminating it as necessary, and (3) to beneficiary financial institutions to facilitate the
identification and reporting of suspicious transactions. Due to the potential terrorist financing
threat posed by small wire transfers, countries should aim for the ability to trace all wire
transfers and should minimise thresholds taking into account the risk of driving transactions
underground. It is not the intention of the FATF to impose rigid standards or to mandate a
single operating process that would negatively affect the payment system. The FATF will
continue to monitor the impact of Special Recommendation VII and conduct an assessment of
its operation within three years of full implementation.
Financial Action Task Force

Interpretative Note to Special Recommendation IX: Cash Couriers
FATF Special Recommendation IX was developed with the objective of ensuring that terrorists
and other criminals cannot finance their activities or launder the proceeds of their crimes through the
physical cross-border transportation of currency and bearer negotiable instruments. Specifically, it
aims to ensure that countries have measures 1) to detect the physical cross-border transportation of
currency and bearer negotiable instruments, 2) to stop or restrain currency and bearer negotiable
instruments that are suspected to be related to terrorist financing or money laundering, 3) to stop or
restrain currency or bearer negotiable instruments that are falsely declared or disclosed, 4) to apply
appropriate sanctions for making a false declaration or disclosure, and 5) to enable confiscation of
currency or bearer negotiable instruments that are related to terrorist financing or money laundering.
Countries should implement Special Recommendation IX subject to strict safeguards to ensure proper
use of information and without restricting either: (i) trade payments between countries for goods and
services; or (ii) the freedom of capital movements in any way.
Financial Action Task Force

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